I eat therefore I am:an essay on human and animal mutuality by Christou, Maria
This article was downloaded by: [Lancaster University Library]
On: 23 March 2015, At: 01:23
Publisher: Routledge
Informa Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number: 1072954 Registered
office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street, London W1T 3JH, UK
Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical
Humanities
Publication details, including instructions for authors and
subscription information:
http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/cang20
I EAT THEREFORE I AM an essay on
human and animal mutuality
Maria Christoua
a Department of English and Creative WritingB192 County
MainLancaster UniversityLancaster LA1 1YDUK
Published online: 12 Mar 2014.
To cite this article: Maria Christou (2013) I EAT THEREFORE I AM an essay on human and
animal mutuality, Angelaki: Journal of the Theoretical Humanities, 18:4, 63-79, DOI:
10.1080/0969725X.2013.869024
To link to this article:  http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/0969725X.2013.869024
PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE
Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of all the information (the
“Content”) contained in the publications on our platform. Taylor & Francis, our agents,
and our licensors make no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,
completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Versions of published
Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open articles and Taylor & Francis and Routledge Open
Select articles posted to institutional or subject repositories or any other third-party
website are without warranty from Taylor & Francis of any kind, either expressed
or implied, including, but not limited to, warranties of merchantability, fitness for a
particular purpose, or non-infringement. Any opinions and views expressed in this article
are the opinions and views of the authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by
Taylor & Francis. The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should be
independently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor & Francis shall not be
liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings, demands, costs, expenses, damages,
and other liabilities whatsoever or howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in
connection with, in relation to or arising out of the use of the Content.
 
This article may be used for research, teaching, and private study purposes. Terms &
Conditions of access and use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-
and-conditions
 
It is essential that you check the license status of any given Open and Open




























H ow does the human come to be? What is atstake in this question is a determination of
the ways in which the existence we name “human”
is constituted. Here, I attempt to approach an
answer through an examination of the treatment
of food in seminal moments of Western thought.
In the Western tradition, the majority of the
efforts to define the human include explicit or
implicit comparisons with animals. Through such
comparisons certain qualities are devised, qualities
that the one category is claimed to possess as
opposed to the other. Derrida summarises the
results of such a history of comparative definitions
when he provides us with a “list,” including
“logos, history, laughing, mourning, burial,” and
shameassomeofthequalitiesthathumansattribute
exclusively to themselves (Animal 5). Further,
Derrida locates “fromAristotle to Lacan” – includ-
ing “Descartes, Kant, Heidegger and Levinas” –
what is denied to animality: “response” (33). In
his analysis, Derrida shows that “response” and
“reaction” overlap, yet all these philosophers
strive to “precisely and rigorously” separate
“response” (which, for them, characterises human
existence alone) “from reaction” (which comes to
characterise animal existence (ibid.)). Through
this extraction of “reaction” from “response,”
then, the human is defined as distinctly human.
Two patterns or schemata that delineate the
production of the definitions of the human
emerge from Derrida’s analysis. The first one,
derived from his list, can be termed “addition of
humanness,” and the second “extraction of ani-
mality.” It seems that Joanne Faulkner is elabor-
ating on this second schema when she argues
that aspects of “our bestial corporeality,” for
example “nutrition, defecation and generation,”
have been “distilled and put aside” in definitions
of the human (76). In so far as these bodily func-
tions are mutual to humans and animals, Faulkner
suggests, they are “put aside” in order for the
human to be distinctly human.
Faulkner, nevertheless, is not referring to
Derrida’s work when making this claim, but to
Giorgio Agamben’s and, more specifically, to
what he calls the “anthropological machine,”
which is held responsible for producing defi-
nitions of the human. Agamben’s machine
reveals the importance of lingering not merely
on the qualities that come to define humanity
but also of digging deeper to discover how
these definitions are produced. When describing
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this machine’s functions, Agamben seems to be
presenting us with two schemata such as those
we located above. The machine, he explains,
defines man and animal by producing “the
inside” through “the inclusion of an outside,”
or “the outside” through “the exclusion of an
inside” (Open 37). These two processes are
“symmetrical” and thus in conjunction with
one another (ibid.).
The “inclusion of an outside” corresponds, to
an extent, to what we termed “addition of
humanness” and the “exclusion of an inside”
to the “extraction of animality.” If these two
functions of the machine produce definitions
of humanity and animality then we are now com-
pelled to discover what allows these functions in
the first place. To do this, we need to have a
closer look at this machine and its parts. Since
the machine can function both by including
“an outside” and by excluding “an inside,”
then we can perhaps envisage it as something
larger that encompasses these processes – a
machine that includes them as two mechanisms.
It is on the locus of their intersection, the point
where these mechanisms overlap, that I want to
focus now.
What I am attempting to describe is the way
Agamben’s machine might be constructed: two
mechanisms or schemata that merge with one
another at a mutual point. This could be
called a “structure” (the structure of the
machine which enables its parts to function) in
the way Deleuze describes this heavily loaded
term. Firstly, says Deleuze, “there must be at
least two heterogeneous series [… ] to form a
structure” (Logic 50). These two series are man-
ifested in the two mechanisms or schemata we
have envisaged as the anthropological machine’s
parts. Secondly, Deleuze argues, “each of these
series is constituted by terms which only exist
through the relations they maintain with one
another” (ibid.). Accordingly, the “inside”
depends on the “outside,” thus the “inclusion
of an outside” (or the “addition of humanness”)
is in conjunction with the “exclusion of an
inside” (or the “extraction of animality”). The
third “conditio[n] for a structure” that Deleuze
provides us with is the intersection of the two
schemata or series (ibid.). “The two
heterogeneous series,” he explains, “converge
toward a paradoxical element, which is their
‘differentiator.’ [… ] This element [is mutual]
[… ]; it belongs to both series at once and
never ceases to circulate throughout them”
(50–51).
It is such a point of convergence that I want
to think about here – themutuality of humanity
and animality, “a paradoxical element” in
Deleuze’s words, which functions as their “dif-
ferentiator.” It is, paradoxically, the human
and animal’s mutuality, I will argue, that
seems to have made possible their conceptual
differentiation in Western thought.
Lev́i-Strauss refers to that which combines
“the conflicting features of two mutually exclu-
sive orders” as a “scandal” (qtd in Derrida,
“Structure, Sign and Play” 358). What for
Lev́i-Strauss is a “scandal” is, in a sense, what
Deleuze refers to as the “paradoxical element”
towards which two heterogeneous series con-
verge. It is such a “scandal” or point of conver-
gence that is the focal point of this essay.
Faulkner names it in her identification of the
mutual elements between humanity and animal-
ity: it is nothing other than the simple fact of
nutrition, the need for food.1 Such a point of
mutuality, Derrida observes in reference to
Lev́i-Strauss, “is something which escapes” the
terms of the opposition that is in question
each time, “and certainly precedes them – prob-
ably as the condition of their possibility” (357).
What follows is an attempt to show that food,
as such a point of mutuality between humanity
and animality, seems to function as a “condition
of their possibility” in the Western tradition,
that is to say, it has been utilised as a means
to their conceptual distinction. Food, then, is
not “put aside” as Faulkner claims; rather, it
is conceptually central in seminal definitions
of the human.
the philosopher disdains food
“The genuine philosopher disdains food,”
Socrates declares, because his “concern is not
for the body” but for “the soul” (Phaedo 10).
This soul seeks to “attain the truth” through
philosophy, but food distracts it with the





























needs of the body; food is, then, a “hindrance”
to philosophising (ibid.). This philosophising
soul that Socrates is referring to is the “rational
soul” that humans alone possess. In so far as
philosophising is understood as an exclusive
capacity of the human, Socrates is almost pre-
senting the philosopher as the human being
“proper” as a result of his disdain for food.
Socrates, then, does not only seem to oppose
body to soul and food to philosophy here, but
also food to “proper” humanness.
Let us consider for a moment the passage in
the Republic in which Socrates speaks of what
he calls “lawless appetites” that are “present
in all of us” but “held back in check” by
reason. “They wake up,” he says,
whenever the rest of the soul – the rational,
gentle, and ruling element – slumbers.
Then the bestial and savage part, full of
food or drink, comes alive [… ] and seeks
to [… ] gratify its own characteristic
instincts [… ] there is no food it refuses to
eat. (270; emphasis added)
Leaving aside the temptation to draw parallels
with elements that would later appear in Freu-
dian psychoanalysis, let us focus here on
Socrates’ association of food with the “beast”
(which he contrasts with rationality). This
“beast” is not something external to the
human; Socrates talks about the bestial part
and the rational element.2 The former governs
a part of the human soul, whereas the rest of
it is ruled by rationality.
In suggesting that we “neither starv[e] nor
overfee[d]” our appetite for food (Republic
271), Socrates makes clear that the rational
element works on the bestial element (and is
thus in conjunction with it); in other words,
rationality mediates the appetite for food. The
only form of humanness that can be actualised,
Socrates seems to be implying, is the result of
mediation, a mediation that is here related to
food, an element mutual to both humanity and
animality. In this sense, the human in Platonic
thought is suspended between a non-actualisa-
ble “pure” humanness and animality.
Despite Socrates’ claim in Phaedo, the philo-
sopher in Plato’s oeuvre does not disdain food;
after all, he is clearly preoccupied with it. (Let
us recall that in texts like Gorgias, Protagoras
and Symposium, food, drink, sophistry and
philosophy appear alongside.) In fact, in
Timaeus the mediation of food, this time not
by rationality but by the “lower belly,”
appears to happen for the sake of philosophy.
The lower belly is “a receptacle” for food; it
retains and solidifies it so that it “might be pre-
vented from passing quickly through and com-
pelling the body to require more food,” which
would make the “whole race an enemy to philos-
ophy” (67). Even though food is here still in
contrast with philosophy, Timaeus suggests
that its mediation, specifically its solidification
in the abdomen, allows philosophy to happen.
For Timaeus, then, philosophy is almost what
Derrida calls “la merde promise” – the result of
the solidification of food, the “leftovers” of
eating, the “restes.”3 In this sense, when
Socrates talks about the “lawless appetite” for
food and about “the rest of the soul,” referring
to the “rational element,” it seems that this
“rest,” this rational element that philosophises
(a quintessentially human quality), is nothing
but the restes, the remains of eating. Thus, the
human and animal’s mutuality (manifested in
their mutual consumption of food) becomes
their differentiator in so far as it makes philos-
ophy possible.
There seems to be an agreement between
Plato and Hegel in the functions they attribute
to food. In Phenomenology of Spirit, for
example, food-related mediations enable the
birth of a philosophising human self-
consciousness.
Food functions as a symbol of the object,
which lacks inherent meaning; the meaning
that humans find in objects comes from the
human spirit itself. “Even the animals are not
shut out from this wisdom,” Hegel argues, for
they are “assured” of the complete lack of
meaning in objects such as food; hence, “they
fall without ceremony and eat” (65). Hegel
suggests that we learn from the animal’s attitude
to food, because it helps us understand that the
meaning we think we find in objects is metapho-
rical, in the etymological sense of the word






























“carrying over”). Once man realises that
the meaning he finds in an object is transferred
to it from himself, Hegel says, the first
stage towards the constitution of self-conscious-
ness, which characterises humanness, is
completed.
The second stage is marked by another trans-
ference; this time, from the object back to the
human spirit. When an animal finds and eats
the food it seeks, Hegel writes, it “finishes up
with the feeling of self,” because the self’s
need for it is thus satisfied (157). Similarly,
when the human spirit encounters an object,
and meaning in this object, it finds satisfaction,
because it was the spirit itself that had trans-
ferred meaning to the object in the first place.
In Hegel’s words, “just as the instinct of the
animal seeks and consumes food, but thereby
brings forth nothing other than itself, so too,
the instinct of Reason in its quest finds only
Reason itself” (ibid.). This is how the human
spirit achieves consciousness; it encounters
itself in the object thereby asserting the self
through the mediation of the object.
The final stage that marks the constitution of
the human is completed with the realisation of
this process of transferences in its totality,
that is, the transference of meaning from the
human spirit to the object, and from the
object back to the human spirit/consciousness.
Consciousness thus comes to realise that what
it perceived as object was nothing but itself,
posed as object. As Hegel declares at the end
of Phenomenology, “[c]onsciousness must
know the object as itself,” attaining, in this
way, the state of self-consciousness which
comes to characterise human existence (480).
The process is completed, then, with the annul-
ment of the object.
This self-consciousness for which the object
is nothing but itself is somewhat like Timaeus’
global “animal” that
had no [… ] organs by the help of which he
might receive his food or get rid of what he
had already digested, since there was
nothing which went from him or came into
him: for there was nothing beside him. Of
design he was created thus, his own waste
providing his own food. (Timaeus 20)
Similarly, if the all-encompassing human self-
consciousness that Hegel presents us with were
to eat food as the object, it seems that, like
Timaeus’ animal, it would be eating its own
waste.
This, however, is only a dream, an ideal of
complete self-sufficiency, as Hegel is well
aware; he acknowledges, for example, that
since self-consciousness knows that it is attained
through the mediation of the object, this knowl-
edge necessarily “makes it aware that the object
has its own independence” (109). If self-con-
sciousness has to negate the object in order to
be born, then this “explicitly affirms that this
nothingness [of the object] is [only] for [self-
consciousness] the truth of the other [the
object]” (ibid.).
The object not only exists independently of
self-consciousness but even prior to it: it is,
after all, the object that allows meaning to be
transferred from the human spirit, which
means that it is the object that actualises
meaning in the sense that it makes meaning per-
ceivable. Since actualisation is a form of cre-
ation, it appears that it is the object that
creates (perceivable) meaning. It is, then, the
means to meaning and, ultimately, to the cre-
ation of self-consciousness, which characterises
human existence and distinguishes it from
animal existence.
In so far as food stands for the object in Phe-
nomenology, we might say that food allows the
creation of meaning and the constitution of
self-consciousness and, therefore, of the
human. This notion of standing for is important
here. Hegel talks about food as such only in
relation to animals. When it comes to humans,
this “as such” undergoes a transformation; it
becomes a “standing for,” a symbol, a metaphor
of a concept – the concept of the object. The
human’s need for real food does not seem to
be a concern in Phenomenology.4
Hegel, however, like Plato, cannot be
seriously “accused” of believing in an ideal of
“pure” humanness conceived of as an existence
totally freed from the corporeal, from food as
such, from animality. In presenting the consti-
tution of self-consciousness as a result of a
series of food-related mediations (food being





























an element associated with the animal realm in
Phenomenology), he implies that “pure”
humanness is impossible. After all, in order to
philosophise and thus constitute self-conscious-
ness, Hegel has recourse to food, which, in this
sense, appears to open the passage to philosophy
and, by extension, to the birth of the human.
Food is transformed into a symbol, a metaphor,
a concept of the object. This conceptual object,
in its turn, allows the process of the transfer-
ences of meaning to occur, which finally leads
to the attainment of self-consciousness. There-
fore, this object (and, by extension, food)
cannot be “altogether done [away] with [… ]
to the point of annihilation”; rather, it can
only be “work[ed] on,” as Hegel asserts (116).
This is a working on and of an element mutual
to humanity and animality which, while reveal-
ing that they are cognate, simultaneously
renders their differentiation possible.
lest he put forth his hand and eat
In both Judaism and Christianity not only
humans and animals but also the divine appear
to eat. This point of convergence, their mutual
consumption of food, becomes a means to
their differentiation – this time through
dietary distinctions. According to Genesis, in
the prelapsarian state animals are “given every
green herb for meat” whereas humans can eat
“every herb bearing seed” and the fruit of
trees “yielding seed” (Gen. 1.29–30), except
from the Tree of Knowledge of Good and Evil
and the Tree of Life because such knowledge
and immortality belong to God. God’s creations
are, then, vegetarian. As we learn from the chap-
ters following the expulsion from Eden, meat
serves as nourishment only for God (through
sacrifices), because he is the giver of life. Since
life belongs to God, humans are not allowed to
kill except for sacrificial reasons.
When man disobeys and acquires the knowl-
edge of Good and Evil, thereby crossing one of
the three dietary lines of distinction with the
divine, God bans him from Eden “lest he put
forth his hand and take also of the Tree of
Life, and eat, and live forever” (Gen. 3.22).
After the Flood, when God accepts that
humans have an inclination towards evil, he
allows them to kill in order to eat meat. The
right to take life inside them through eating
meat would mean that another one of the
dietary boundaries of distinction with the
divine would be crossed. Therefore, God intro-
duces a new dietary prohibition to ensure separ-
ation. This time, he prohibits “eat[ing] flesh
with its life, that is, with its blood” (Gen. 9.4).
Significantly, food functions as a means of
differentiation not only between but also
within categories. Jews, for example, as a
chosen people, have to adhere to additional
dietary prohibitions to ensure the “purity” of
their racial identity: when it comes to meat-
eating, they must eat only clean beasts. Jean
Soler deciphers the directions given in Leviticus
and Deuteronomy and devises a system that
explains which animals would count as clean
and which as unclean. For example, unclean
beasts are those that “show an anomaly in
their relation to the element that has ‘brought
them forth’ or to the organs characteristic of
life” in that element (63). A clean animal,
then, would be one that keeps to the element
that characterises its existence (fish/sea,
birds/air, and so on).
These enforced dietary prohibitions as well as
the elaborate distinctions between foodstuffs
(primarily in the Old Testament) imply that
the separations between and within categories
have to be actively preserved. Since differen-
tiations spring from mutuality, such distinc-
tions are not inherently clear; if food is a
border between categories, then, like every
border, it both separates and joins them. This
implication of joining becomes clearer in the
New Testament with the consumption of flesh
and blood at the Last Supper; in such a con-
sumption, the human and the divine merge.
The edibility of Jesus’ flesh and blood is
worth pausing on, for this is a characteristic
that is not exclusive to divinity – all three cat-
egories either are, or become, flesh and blood:
animals are such from their creation; man is
fashioned out of clay and when God breathes
into him, he becomes a creature of flesh and
blood; and, finally, the son of God becomes






























This mutual characteristic of their existence,
their flesh and blood, renders all three cat-
egories, in one way or another, edible.
Humans, as we have seen, are given permission
to eat animal flesh and God seems to nourish on
animal blood, through sacrifices. In instructing
Abraham to sacrifice Isaac, God seems to
suggest that he could also feed on human
blood. Further, Jesus’ flesh is eaten and his
blood is drunk at the Last Supper and its re-
enactments in the ritual of the Eucharist. This
complicates further the structure I have been
trying to describe here: if the point of conver-
gence of the three categories is their mutual con-
sumption of food, then it seems that at this
mutual point each category can also become
food; members of one category can serve as
nourishment for members of another since
they are all creatures of flesh and blood.
Derrida’s claim that eating is always a “meto-
nymy of introjection” and that we must there-
fore “identify with the other, who is to be
assimilated, interiorized” thus comes to mind
(“‘Eating Well’” 115). Since members of all
three categories are creatures of flesh and
blood, and since this mutual characteristic
renders them all potentially edible, it seems
that any ingestion of the other can be under-
stood as the ingestion of the self; one eats and
is eaten at the same time – the other’s consum-
able flesh and blood is the self’s consumable
flesh and blood. In this sense, consumer and
consumed appear to be profoundly of “one
flesh,” “one blood.” It is such an understanding
that could found what Sara Guyer terms “an
ethics of cannibalism,” an ethics that would
allow a fairer, more respectful relationship
between eater and eaten, self and other,
human and animal (“Albeit Eating” 67).
Flesh and blood, then, join humanity, animal-
ity and divinity by rendering them mutually
edible. Simultaneously, this point of their con-
vergence, this border that joins them, is also a
border that separates them – it is the point
where the possibility of their differentiation is
constituted. This is manifested through blood
in particular. As we have seen, the blood of
clean animals is differentiated from the blood
of unclean animals: the former must not be
shed, for unclean animals are inedible,
whereas the latter can be drained so that their
flesh can be eaten. This distinction ensures the
differentiation of the Hebrews from other
races. As a chosen people, Jews must not “con-
taminate” their “purity” by eating animals of
unclean blood. Guyer observes that blood-
based separations “emphasise the stakes of
[ … ] a situation of subjectivity that uses inges-
tion as its metonymy” (76). If this is so, then we
could say that the incorporation of the clean
flesh of animals of clean blood is a metonymy
of the creation of a people that is “of clean
blood” in so far as it is separated from other
peoples.5
Now, since eating can be seen as a metonymy,
it follows that food must be somehow associated
with signification, language. In his reading of
the Old Testament, Soler has observed that crea-
tures that do not stick to one element, the ined-
ible beasts, “are unclean because they are
unthinkable” (57). For something to be think-
able it must be signifiable, and when something
is signifiable it seems to become edible. Soler’s
observation calls for an association between
God and the unclean beasts, because God is
also unthinkable, un-signifiable; his name in
the Hebrew Scriptures, YHWH (Yahweh), is a
name that cannot be pronounced. In this
sense, the eating of God would be forbidden
for Jewish people, as opposed to Christians
who eat God in the Eucharist (Jesus is homoou-
sian, “of the same substance” as God, according
to the Nicene Creed). The association between
the edible and the signifiable in the Old Testa-
ment is also manifested when God puts words
in Ezekiel’s mouth. In eating these words,
Ezekiel eats the signifiable, the meaningful
(Ezek. 3.1–4).6
The correlation between food and significa-
tion acquires a different form in the New Testa-
ment; what is eaten is not necessarily the
meaningful, but its consumption becomes a
means to meaning. In her reading of the New
Testament, Julia Kristeva cites two tales of mul-
tiplication of food (Mark 6.38ff. and 8.4ff.),
arguing that, along with his concern to feed a
large number of people, “Jesus does not cease
calling upon understanding to decipher the





























meaning of his action” (117). According to Kris-
teva, the significance of the food-related mira-
cles for Jesus is their opening of the passage to
meaning. This element that is mutual to human-
ity, animality and divinity – food – thus appears
to either coincide with or lead to signification,
enabling, in this way, and on this additional
level, the designation or definition of these cat-
egories and, therefore, their signifiable
differentiation.
sex is secretly food
According to Mark Forsyth, “Freud said that
everything was secretly sexual, but etymologists
know that sex is secretly food”; mating with
somebody was originally sharing meat with
them, Forsyth explains, and meat is etymologi-
cally any kind of food (30). Even though
Freud does not acknowledge this etymological
link, his descriptions of the constitution of
human sexuality are drenched in food
references.
Food is at the origin of the development of
human sexuality for Freud. Eating, he argues,
is “the first and most vital activity” of the
infant; it provides the first “pleasurable sen-
sation” by satisfying the need for nourishment
(Three Essays 181–82). Simultaneously, eating
arouses the need for sensual pleasure by activat-
ing the lips as an erotogenic zone. In this initial
stage, when “sexual activity has not yet been
separated from the ingestion of food,” Freud
explains that “the sexual aim consists in the
incorporation of the object” (198).
These two instincts are then separated and
directed towards different objects – the nutri-
tional instinct towards milk and the sexual
towards the breast. The latter has to be sub-
sequently transferred to another sensual
object. Initially, Freud says, the child “prefers
a part of his own skin,” the thumb for
example (182). This autoerotic phase ends
with the transference of this object from the
child’s own body to an external sensuous
object. These transferences, at the origin of
which food is found, mark the constitution of
“normal” human sexuality in Freudian
psychoanalysis.
Freud’s theorisation on this series of transfer-
ences implies that there is another sort of trans-
ference going on, one that doubles the series he
describes. If food activates the sexual instinct of
the infant, then this instinct must already be
present in a not-yet-activated state. This not-
yet-activated state, it follows, must also have
an object; an un-palpable, un-definable, fantasti-
cal one. It is precisely this object that character-
ises the Freudian understanding of a specifically
human sexuality.
Food appears to be the first metaphor or
symbol of this fantastical object of desire – it
is its first metaphorical actualisation, its first
symbolic representation. In this light, it seems
that when food gets transferred to (or, is substi-
tuted by) the breast and the subsequent objects,
these objects function as metaphors or symbols
of the first metaphor, the first symbol (food) of
the fantastical object.
Food thus seems to initiate the creation of a
series of metaphorical substitutes. As we shall
see shortly with the help of two other psycho-
analysts, language can be claimed to be devel-
oped on the basis of such a substitution. In
this sense, the need for food (mutual to both
humanity and animality), by making possible
the passage to language, leads to the differen-
tiation of the human from the animal.
Nicholas Abraham and Maria Torok make
this implication clearer. They argue that when
the mother’s breast (as a source of food) with-
draws from the child’s mouth, the mouth’s emp-
tiness necessitates finding “ways of requesting
its presence”; initially it is “cries and sobs,”
then “calling,” and finally “language” (127).
The authors suggest that the language which
comes to mark the birth of human subjectivity
is developed for the sole purpose of requesting
food, and this substitution of food with words
gradually becomes satisfying in itself. “The
early satisfactions of the mouth, as yet filled
with the maternal object,” they write, “are par-
tially and gradually replaced by the satisfactions
of a mouth now empty of that object but filled
with words pertaining to the subject” (ibid.).
This development, Abraham and Torok con-
tinue, can be reverted in cases of traumatic loss.






























mouth, failing to be filled with words that would
express (and thus acknowledge) the loss,
“reverts to being the food-craving mouth it
was prior to the acquisition of speech” (128).
In such fantasies, then, words are internalised
(almost eaten) instead of being externalised
through expression. They become literal,
though this is not “a matter of reverting to the
literal meaning of words” but of turning them
into non-signifying objects, robbing them of
“their very capacity for figurative represen-
tation,” which amounts to destroying them
(132).
In Totem and Taboo Freud describes rituals
of actual incorporation following William
Robertson’s work. Various tribes, Freud says,
ritually share meals so that a “common sub-
stance” is transferred to the members of the
tribe through the food they eat, producing, in
this way, their kinship (134–35). The most
important meal-sharing ritual is the “sacrificial
feast” in which the totem animal (which was
“originally identical with the gods”) is killed,
dissected, and devoured by the members of
the tribe (136). Sharing food joins the
members of the tribe (thereby distinguishing
them from other tribes) and, in eating the
totem animal/god, they are joined with, or
become “of the same substance” as, animals/
gods (135).
The Eucharist in Christianity resembles this
“sacrificial feast,” in which the totem animal/
god is eaten and the eater is joined with it.
Further, in Judaism, as in the rituals that
Freud describes, the distinction of the Hebrew
race from other races is preserved through the
food they eat. If, as I suggested above, the
eating of God would be forbidden in Judaism
(like the eating of the un-thinkable animals),
then the “sacrificial feast” would be a transgres-
sion of this prohibition. It is precisely on such a
transgression that Freud focuses. He uses the
killing and the devouring of the totem animal/
god as an outline to create a “story” about the
“originary”murder of the father. Two brothers,
Freud’s story goes, kill and devour their father;
in eating him, they identify with him and
acquire a portion of his strength. This murder
and devouring is, for Freud, the origin of the
contradictory feelings of guilt and love
towards the father (143).7 Freud then uses the
material he presents us with in Totem and
Taboo to reinforce his Oedipus complex
theory. The importance of food, from a psycho-
analytic perspective, clearly remains, for Freud,
essentially limited to the subject of sexuality and
to the individual’s early life.
Anna O.’s case, however, presses for the
ascription of a lasting psychoanalytic signifi-
cance to food, especially in relation to language.
This case fascinated Freud, who would later
work on Joseph Breuer’s descriptions of his
patient’s condition to develop his understanding
of hysteria and its cure. Both Breuer and Freud
failed to make a connection between speaking
and eating, even though the two activities were
obviously linked in Anna’s case.
During her illness, we are told, Anna refused
food and her capacity to speak gradually deterio-
rated. Breuer managed to cure her by getting
her to talk; she told him a story per day. If he
could not see her on one day, she told him two
stories when she next saw him to make up for
the lost day. Breuer thus realised that no
stories should be “‘stuck’ inside her” (Studies
32). When Anna started getting the stories
out, it is noted, in passing, that she started
eating. A pattern can be detected here: so long
as words were not “stuck” in the body, food
was allowed in.
We are led to believe that Anna’s acceptance
of food signified her gradual recovery. At the
end of his narration, Breuer explains Anna’s
eating disorder by locating it in a past traumatic
experience, which might have indeed been the
case. However, the fact that neither Breuer
nor Freud (who re-assessed Anna’s case later
on) paid enough attention to how eating func-
tioned during Anna’s illness left an aspect of
this illness unexplained. For a period of time
Anna started speaking in English (and other
foreign languages) rather than German,
without realising it. Even when she was given
German texts to read out she produced extem-
pore translations. It is noted, in passing again,
that during this period Anna refused taking
nourishment completely (26–27). Had Breuer
or Freud noticed the pattern between words





























and food, they might have used it to explain
Anna’s speech disorder.8 If food, by being trans-
ferred inside the body, allowed the words to
come out, functioning as some sort of mediating
factor, then when Anna refused this particular
mediation, another one was required for the
words to come out: (unconscious) translation.
In so far as in Anna’s case we can detect a
passage from food to words, then this case pro-
vides evidence that such a passage is not mani-
fested exclusively during the individual’s early
life, as is suggested in Three Essays on
Sexuality.
If Freud’s theory on the development of
human sexuality implies that food ultimately
leads to the acquisition of language, and if
Abraham and Torok suggest that language is a
result of the need for food, then Anna’s case
shows the implications that a “putting aside”
of food would have. To refuse food, the point
of convergence of humanity and animality/divi-
nity (a convergence laid bare in Totem and
Taboo), is to refuse language, the means to
their definition. In so far as the language of sig-
nification is a defining characteristic of the
human, then to “put aside” food is to block
the passage to signification, definition,
differentiation.
the animal is simply taken by the
food
Is the need for food (a need mutual to humans
and animals) a manifestation of a wider point
of convergence between humanity and animal-
ity? How might we describe this mutuality
that constitutes the possibility of their differen-
tiation in broader terms? Heidegger’s work
helps us approach answers to these questions.
In Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics
Heidegger contemplates a bee’s “drivenness in
the search for food” (241). A bee “finds a drop
of honey in a clover blossom,” he writes; it
“sucks [it] up” and “flies away” when the
honey runs out, which makes him wonder
whether the bee recognises that “the honey is
no longer present” or, for that matter, “the pres-
ence of honey in the first place” (ibid.). For the
answer, Heidegger resorts to a hypothesis
advanced after an experiment in which “a bee
was placed before a little bowl filled with so
much honey that the bee was unable to suck”
it all at once (242). If the bee’s abdomen is
removed from its body while it is sucking, the
hypothesis goes, the bee would “carry on regard-
less,” not realising that it has taken more honey
than its abdomen would have been able to
contain (ibid.). Based on this, Heidegger con-
cludes that “the bee is simply taken by the
food,” which “excludes the possibility of any
recognition of presence. It is precisely being
taken by its food that prevents the animal
from taking up a position over and against this
food” (ibid.).
In Fundamental Concepts the animal’s
immersion in its food stands for its immersion
in its environment. Focusing on food, to which
both humans and animals have a relation, Hei-
degger reveals a broader mutual element
between humanity and animality: both humans
and animals stand in relation to the world.
What characterises the animal’s relation to its
world is its total immersion in it – its “open-
ness” (248). It is precisely its particular open-
ness, Heidegger says, that prevents the animal
from recognising its environment and the
elements that populate it “as beings” (ibid.).
This inability to connect to beings or things as
such that Heidegger attributes to the animal
leads him to the conclusion that the animal’s
“openness” is “a peculiar captivation” (243);
this is why the animal cannot take up a “position
over and against [its] food” or any other element
of its world (242).9
If the point of convergence between human-
ity and animality is, in broader terms, their
relation to or openness in the world, then in
what ways, the question arises, is man’s open-
ness different from the animal’s?
In Fundamental Concepts the animal’s open-
ness is manifested in its eating whereas man’s
openness is manifested in the experience of
boredom.10 Man is, Heidegger explains, pre-
sented with possibilities (like reading or going
for a walk) that he would have normally actua-
lised; in boredom, though, he does not let






























itself” (137). For Heidegger, boredom “mani-
fest[s]” that which “could and was to be
granted to Dasein” (140). Humans, unlike
animals, can see the possibilities they would
have normally actualised and can refrain from
doing so. As a result of this capacity to refrain
we humans can be “relieved of our everyday per-
sonality” and “elevated beyond” the particular
circumstances that envelop us at a specific place
and time (137).
What “sustains Dasein’s potentiality” is the
capacity to refrain from always being “taken
by” possibilities that present themselves in the
environment (144). This is precisely, Heidegger
argues, “the originary making-possible of
Dasein as such,” what “lends [Dasein] possi-
bility” (143). This, then, is what characterises
the human’s openness in the world: humans
can see “the open”; they recognise the presence
of possibilities which they sometimes choose
not to actualise – they are not, in other
words, helplessly immersed in the world, like
animals are.
Openness, then, is in conjunction with poten-
tiality in Heidegger’s work. Man’s potentiality,
as Heidegger presents it, is a negative potential-
ity since it consists in not actualising potentials.
In insisting that the animal’s immersion in its
environment is a “captivation,” Heidegger
implies that its openness is more of a “closed-
ness” since potentials are actualised without
either recognition or choice (243). As Derrida
observes, the animal’s “openness is without
openness” for Heidegger (“Eating Well” 111).
However, it seems that we can, instead,
view the human’s openness as a “closedness”
in the sense of an “enclosing” or “caging” of
potentials, in so far as it consists in recognising
possibilities and refraining from actualising
them.
What Heidegger presents as the animal’s
immersion in its food (and, by extension, its
immersion in its environment) coincides, to an
extent, with what Deleuze calls “pure imma-
nence” (“Immanence” 360/27). This “pure
immanence,” Deleuze explains, does not mean
“immanence to” something else (ibid.). If this
were the case, then a recognition “of something
as something” would be presupposed, and such
a recognition, Heidegger insists, is impossible
for the animal (Fundamental Concepts 246–
48). As we have seen, the animal’s total immer-
sion in its world prevents it from recognising
beings and things as such, as far as Heidegger
is concerned.
Deleuze’s “immanent life,” which thus seems
to coincide with Heidegger’s conception of the
animal’s total immersion in its environment, is
a life of “pure potential [pure puissance]”
(“Immanence” 361/30; translation modified).
In this sense, the animal’s openness is an immer-
sion in pure potentiality, whereas the human’s
openness is characterised by a caging of potenti-
ality. Humans come to acquire the human life
(which distinguishes them from animals)
through caging what Deleuze calls “a life [une
vie]” – a “singular” and therefore mutual life
(irreducible to human existence) understood as
pure immanence, pure potentiality (ibid.).11
The point of convergence between human
and animal existence is, then, potentiality and
this is where the two categories spring from.
The condition of their possibility (the possi-
bility of their distinction) is potentiality itself,
a potentiality that has to be caged so that the
human is born.
hungering for words
In Nietzsche’s oeuvre, this caging of potentiality
that marks the birth of the human assumes the
form of a solidification of metaphoricity. I
would argue that, in Nietzsche’s philosophy, it
is this solidification that leads to the creation
of words, which come to characterise human
existence, thereby separating it from animal
existence.
For Nietzsche the literal is indistinguishable
from the metaphorical. “[T]he German spirit,”
apparently, “comes from distressed intestines”;
it is a case of “indigestion” caused by the “over-
cooked meat, [the] greasy mealy vegetables [and
the] pastries degenerating into paperweights”
that comprise the German cuisine (Ecce Homo
20). The “German palate,” Nietzsche says,
finds “everything to its taste”; any unfitting
combination is appetising (82). From this, he
concludes that the German spirit’s “prejudices





























emanate from the bowels,” because it “nourishe[s]
itself on opposites and gulps down ‘faith’ as well
as scientificity, ‘Christian morality’ as well as
anti-Semitism” (20, 82). This is, perhaps, a cri-
tique unleashed against one particular German
spirit, the Hegelian, which devours contradic-
tory beliefs resulting in what Nietzsche views
as an unfitting and harmful synthesis.
Malcolm Pasley views Nietzsche’s treatment
of food, which is indistinguishably literal
(for the body) and metaphorical (for the
spirit/mind), as an example of his “insidious
habit” of “taking metaphors literally” (141).
However, I would argue that it is the insistence
in separating the two that Nietzsche wants to cri-
ticise as an insidious habit.
As we have seen, both Plato and Hegel move
from food to philosophy, from the concrete to
the abstract, from the literal to the metaphori-
cal. Such a movement from the one to the other
presupposes the separation of two. Similarly,
in Abraham and Torok’s theory, as well as in
the New Testament, a passage is traced from
food to words/signification, and in Freudian
psychoanalysis food is presented as that
which initiates the creation of metaphors,
thereby opening the passage to language. In
these cases the metaphorical (which is in con-
junction with language) is separated from the
literal (food, the body). Even though speaking
and eating are presented as cognate – indeed,
both activities originate in the mouth – they
are subsequently separated, a separation that
almost creates two different mouths: the
eating mouth and the speaking mouth.
Deleuze spots this separation, this creation of
two mouths, when he observes that the sound
of the “mouth which speaks” is “no longer
the noise of a body [or, a mouth] which eats”;
the speaking mouth is separated from the
eating mouth in order for the human subject
that expresses itself in language to be mani-
fested (Logic 181).
In the Old Testament, this separation
between speaking and eating collapses – words
are put into the mouth and are eaten. Derrida
also seems to be bringing the two together in
arguing that all the senses are metonymies of
the eating mouth (“‘Eating Well’” 114). What
the mouth eats as the other is what is tasted
and touched as the other, what the nose
smells, the eye sees, and the ear hears as the
other and, indeed, what we speak of, what we
signify as the other. The eating mouth, then,
coincides with the speaking mouth. Nietzsche,
along with the Old Testament before him
and Derrida after him, reveals that the metapho-
rical (the signifiable, language) is the literal
(food).
For Nietzsche, metaphors are as solid as food;
they are solidifications of the indefinite, the
abstract. Let us consider, for example, a claim
he makes in an earlier essay: “the concept,”
which is as “bony [and] foursquare” as “a
die,” is “the residue of a metaphor” (“Truth
and Lies” 118). To decipher this claim we
must first distinguish between two different
understandings of metaphor that seem to
emerge from Nietzsche’s writings. The meta-
phorical is different from metaphor; the
former is the “residue,” or the solidification,
of the latter. The metaphorical, which for
Nietzsche coincides with the literal (etymologi-
cally: “of the letter” and thus words, language),
is the result of an abandoning of the “primitive
world of metaphor” (119).
I will be referring to this “primitive world of
metaphor” as “metaphoricity” to avoid con-
fusion. The fluid realm of metaphoricity,
where anything can potentially and infinitely
stand for anything else (but where no metaphors
have been established), can be seen as a manifes-
tation of potentiality. To create words (letters,
the literal and thus the metaphorical since
they coincide) is to solidify the fluidity of meta-
phoricity. A word, Nietzsche says, “arbitrarily
discard[s] the individual differences” of the
countless things or beings it signifies, which
“are never equal” (117). Words, then, give con-
crete forms to the things or beings they desig-
nate. It is in this sense that the concept (as a
product of language) is “foursquare,” a fixed
shape, like a die (118).
The Nietzschean man is characterised by this
solidification of metaphoricity, this caging of
potentiality that leads to the creation of words
that differentiate him from animals. For






























result of an “opening up” from something
material (like food) to something more abstract
(like philosophy) as is the case in Plato and
Hegel. Rather, it is a passage that assumes the
form of a “closing,” a narrowing down, a solidi-
fication of the fluid, the indefinite, the abstract
to something concrete, literal: the letter, words.
If Nietzsche views the separation of the literal
from the metaphorical as an “insidious habit,”
then it is perhaps because the metaphorical
(words, language) comes to be associated with
an abstractness that supposedly liberates from,
and elevates above the bodily. Indeed, Heideg-
ger presents the disengagement from the
material circumstances that envelop man as an
“elevation.” Nietzsche, on the contrary, pre-
sents the passage to humanness not as a liber-
ation but as a migration from the freedom of
fluidity to something solid and, therefore, con-
fining. He elsewhere describes the human
through a parallel with “water animals,” who
became “land animals,” that is, they walked
on the solid ground and turned this into their
environment (Genealogy 66). Like them, man
swam from the water towards land and inhab-
ited it; he moved from metaphoricity to
language and thus began to speak.12
Alongside Nietzsche’s presentation of
language as a confining encasement of meta-
phoricity is Guyer’s understanding of speaking
as that which creates a solid figure, the face,
which articulates a limiting, fundamentally
anthropocentric ethics. As a denotation of fragi-
lity, the face for Levinas is what forbids us to
kill, a prohibition that applies only to faces
created by speaking mouths, Guyer observes
(“Buccality” 79). Animals are left faceless in
so far as their mouths are not speaking
mouths and are, therefore, excluded from an
ethics that would protect them as it protects
humans.13 Guyer rejects the face, proposing its
substitution with a mouth prior to speech. Fol-
lowing Jean-Luc Nancy’s work, she defines
this mouth as “bucca,” explaining that it is
different from “a mouth that belongs to
someone, to a subject who speaks”; it is,
rather, “the mouth that belongs to no one, the
mouth that becomes a mouth in the opening
of a one who – opened, disfigured – has no
face” (90). A “defacing of ethics ordered by
faces” (80), and an articulation of “an ethical
law ordered by the mouth [bucca]” (78), would
allow us to enter a fairer, a more open and
respectful relationship with animals. The
“closing” effected by the face would be reverted
by the “opening” of the mouth.
If the passage to land that Nietzsche describes
creates the human face through the creation of
words, then this face can be seen as a result of
the solidification of metaphoricity. This solidifi-
cation, the creation of the metaphorical (thus
the literal, letters, words) is, for Nietzsche,
“the fundamental human drive” (“Truth and
Lies” 121). Humans, then, are characterised by
their drive to create the metaphorical, their
hunger is a hunger for words and, ultimately,
for the human face. If, in Heidegger, man’s
characteristic potentiality is manifested in
boredom, in Nietzsche it is manifested in this
hunger for words, a hunger to solidify meta-
phoricity (understood as potentiality). In a
crucial sentence, Nietzsche claims that
“hunger is no proof that the food that would
satisfy it exists,” but, rather, that “it desires
the food” (Human 70). In this sense, the
human’s hunger for words, for the all-too-
human face, does not prove that this face
exists but that it is desired and, therefore, orig-
inally lacked.
digesting: by way of conclusion
The human face can only be originally absent,
lacked, in so far as humanness and animality
are cognate. At their origin (the point of their
convergence) there are no characteristics that
would distinguish them. (This would imply a
pre-existing, pre-defined human and a pre-exist-
ing, pre-defined animal, parts of one merging
with the other.) The point bears some elabor-
ation in relation to language. As probably the
most primary human characteristic, language
would seem to emerge from such an originary
point of convergence. Therefore, the human
does not develop language; language and man
are produced alongside and in the same way.
“[T]he origin of language and the origin of
man [are] one and the same.”





























Agamben cites Heymann Steinthal, who
makes the above claim, arguing that it is a
failure to realise this that renders the functions
of the anthropological machine “aporetic”
(Open 37). “[P]recisely because the human is
already presupposed” when definitions are
sought, the “outside” can only ever be the exclu-
sion of an inside already conceived of as animal-
istic (ibid.). It is in this sense that the definitions
of humanness and animality that this machine
produces are aporetic.
While Agamben locates the machine’s func-
tions as well as what makes them aporetic
(the presupposition of the human), what I
attempted to discover here is what enables
these functions in the first place, what sets
the machine in motion, if you will – namely,
the human and animal’s mutuality. The treat-
ment of food in Western thought reveals, con-
trary to what is generally assumed, that it is
their point of convergence (as manifested in
their mutual need for, and consumption of,
food) that has been utilised as a means to
their conceptual differentiation, to the pro-
duction of their definitions (albeit aporetic). It
is within this mutuality, this point of conver-
gence conceived of as potentiality, that the
“addition/extraction” or “inclusion/exclusion”
processes are initiated. In fact, the theorisation
of a “closing” of potentiality that is detectable
in Heidegger’s work might just be interpreted
as the originary exclusion; in so far as poten-
tials are not actualised, they are, in a sense,
excluded. This exclusion is, simultaneously,
the originary addition, the addition of the
capacity to exclude, to refrain from actualising
potentials.
At this final point, I want to clarify that my
aim here has not been to assess the validity of
the definitions of humanness and animality I
have been engaging with, but to bring to the
forefront the “structure” (in the Deleuzian
sense) that seems to underlie the production of
these definitions. Now, in positing the human
and animal’s mutuality as the “differentiator”
of this structure, I have not attempted to
render problematic the conceptual distinctions
of humanness and animality that emerge from
it – an overwhelming number of thinkers have
already taken this to task, with varying
degrees of success. Rather, what I hope to
have achieved is to have placed a certain empha-
sis on the importance of shifting our attention
both from the specific qualities that are
devised in order to conceptually differentiate
human and animal, and from the patterns or
schemata that characterise the devising of
these qualities – the functions of the anthropolo-
gical machine – in order to focus on what
enables them in the first place – namely,
mutuality. Since the common need for, and
consumption of, food is an exemplification of
mutuality, it might be that, by focusing on
this, a new form of ethics (as regards human
and animal relationships) can be reached, an
ethics based on “buccality,” on a mouth “in
which eating-speaking-breathing-spitting” are
“undifferentiated,” as Guyer has it (“Buccality”
90).
However, such a return to this mouth prior to
speech and subjectivity would seem to signal
some sort of pathology (a regression to a pre-
vious stage of development in psychoanalytic
terms) and is, to my mind, politically danger-
ous. The importance of focusing on this mutual-
ity, I would argue, lies not so much in trying to
devise a specific form of ethics from it but in
alerting us to its utilisation to certain ends. If
in the examples of Western thought I have
dealt with above this mutuality has been utilised
in order to conceptually differentiate human-
ness and animality, then what are the political
implications of this? When Nietzsche parallels
humans with those water animals that had to
make their passage to land, he tells us that the
state imposes “frightening fortifications” to
“protect itself against the old [… ] freedom”
(Genealogy 66). This freedom of the water, of
fluidity, might be the freedom of potentiality
which has, in this analysis, been associated
with mutuality. What other manifestations of
such utilisations of mutuality can we detect in
today’s so-called global world? (The very term
“globalisation” is already associated with
mutuality, a mutuality that is, of course,
manipulated or “closed off” in certain cases.)
And which are the “frightening fortifications”






























mutuality in the economico-political systems we
operate under? Though these questions are
beyond the scope of this essay,
they highlight the necessity of lin-
gering further on the utilisations
of the mutuality of humanity
and animality and their varying
manifestations in other realms.
notes
I would like to thank Joel Evans, Arthur Bradley,
John Schad, and my anonymous reviewer for
their insightful comments on earlier drafts of this
essay.
1 Lévi-Strauss might have objected to this positing
of food as a “scandal,” for he associates cooked
food with culture and raw with nature. He
acknowledges complications, though. In roasted
food, for example, the outside is cooked and the
inside is raw; therefore, it combines elements of
both categories (“Culinary Triangle” 30). This
brief observation suffices to show that food does
not easily conform to oppositions such as
culture/nature or humanity/animality.
2 In Timaeus “the part of the soul which desires
meats and drinks” is “like a wild animal which
was chained up with[in] man” (64).
3 This is from Derrida’s unpublished seminar
series “Rhétorique du Cannibalisme” (University
of California, Irvine, 1990). The references are
from David Farrell Krell’s account of the seminars,
which is based on the notes that Derrida had
prepared for the course (“All You Can’t Eat”
147, 136).
4 Marx, on the contrary, focuses on man’s
hunger, arguing that it reveals him to be a
“limited creature, like animals and plants” (Early
Writings 390). Hunger is the point of convergence
of human, animal and plant existence, and it func-
tions as the condition that makes possible their
distinction. The “production of the means to
satisfy [various] needs,” hunger primarily, since
“life involves before everything else eating and
drinking,” is the “first historical act,” which
marks the birth of human existence (German Ideol-
ogy 48). If “material activity” is “the language of
real life,” as Marx and Engels say (47), then the sat-
isfaction of the need for food is the first word of
this language.
5 If the animals’ clean blood reflects the clean
blood of the chosen people, then the necessity to
drain it before the flesh is consumed could be
viewed as a measure to prevent figurative cannibal-
ism. To this extent, Guyer’s “ethics of cannibalism”
is applicable in this instance.
6 Deleuze would probably have interpreted Eze-
kiel’s eating of words as a manifestation of “the
primary order of schizophrenia.” According to
Deleuze, in this order the “‘pure’ expressed of
words” is mingled with “the body’s olfactory, gus-
tatory, or digestive affects” (Logic 91).
7 This is reminiscent of Melanie Klein’s
description of the dissection and incorporation
of the mother, or the mother’s breast, and the
contradictory feelings towards her/it. The breast
is split into “the good breast” (which “is
gratifying”) and “the bad breast” (which causes
frustration when it withdraws from the infant’s
mouth). Feelings of love and hate are projected
on the respective breasts (and, by extension, on
the mother) which are, “by introjection,”
established inside the infant’s body (199–200).
For a revision of Klein’s theory see Deleuze
(Logic esp. 186–95).
8 For more cases that seem to verify the pattern
“food in–words out” (and vice versa) see Freud’s
Early Psycho-analytic Publications (esp. 32–33), and
Studies on Hysteria (esp. 211–12).
9 Heidegger seems to agree with Georges Bataille
who claims that “[b]etween the animal that is eaten
and the one that eats, there is no relation of subor-
dination like that connecting an object, a thing, to
man”; thus, “every animal is in the world like water in
water,” totally immersed in it (18–19). For
Bataille, however, this immediacy to or immanence
in the world is not limitedness or captivation, but
harmony.
10 As Levinas has famously observed, “Dasein in
Heidegger is never hungry” (134).
11 Heidegger’s concept of potentiality is, never-
theless, Aristotelian: an actualised potential is no
longer a potential. A boy, for example, has the
potential to become a man; once he becomes a
man, the potential is negated in actualisation.
Therefore, not actualising a potential is preserving
it as a potential. However, such a teleological
understanding is at odds with the very concept of
potentiality; if something is already mapped out
then it cannot count as “truly” potential. A “true”





























potential cannot be recognised or contemplated.
The Deleuzian potentiality, as opposed to the Hei-
deggerian, coincides with actuality (actualisation of
potentials without recognition); to recognise and
choose not to actualise a potential is to cancel it
as “truly” potential.
12 In this sense, the immersion of animals in
potentiality (or metaphoricity) would mean that
they are plunged in a pure language, a language
prior to signification. This is what Agamben
means when he claims that “[a]nimals are not in
fact denied language; on the contrary they are
always and totally language” (Infancy 59).
13 Carol J. Adams argues that the word “meat” is
a “mass term,” which denies the situated life of the
specific animal that is to be consumed (115). This is
an example of animal facelessness, which allows the
humans to apply to animals ever-changing faces; a
cow, for example, is viewed as a milk-machine
and then converted into meat.
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